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COMMENTS
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR CORPORATE ILLEGALITY
Increasing numbers of Americans have be-
come aware that crime exists in the suites of
many corporations just as surely as it exists in
the streets of their cities and suburbs. The
relative complexity and diffuse effects of cor-
porate crime' have often hidden its true impact
on society, but its costs-both economic2 and
physical 3 -are staggering. Efforts to utilize le-
gal processes to counteract this phenomenon
have proceeded on several fronts: the con-
sumer movement, today acknowledged as one
of the most significant social movements of this
century,4 has sought to combat corporate crime
and irresponsibility by lobbying for consumer
For purposes of this Comment, "corporate
crime" encompasses any illegal activity through which
the actor seeks to use the corporate form to increase
corporate wealth, rather than personal wealth. This
type of misconduct has been labeled "acquisitive
corporate crime." Comment, Increasing Community
Control Over Corporate Crime, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 281
(1961). Thus, on the federal level, for example,
corporate crime would include violations of the crim-
inal provisions of the antitrust, securities, public
welfare and labor laws.
2 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that
even the short term direct cost of white collar crime
is at least $40 billion annually. White Collar Justice, 759
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA 1976) Part II
[hereinafter cited as White Collar Justice].
' In the industries regulated by the Food and
Drug Administration alone, recent data indicate that
"over-prescription" promoted by the drug companies
leads to 60,000 to 140,000 deaths each year, and that
cosmetics injure an estimated 60,000 persons an-
nually. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAM-
ING THE GIANT CORPORATION 25-26 (1976) (herein-
after cited as TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION].
4 THE CONSUMER AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY 2 (R. Nader ed. 1973). Due largely to increased
levels of education and sophistication among the
American people, consumer expectations have risen
dramatically in the last 20 years. In addition to any
legal changes the movement has wrought, significant
changes in corporate policy and structure have been
effected which expedite the corporations* responsive-
ness to consumers. Examples include consumer "hot
lines," s~stematic complaint-handling mechanisms,
expanded warranty coverage and increased point-
of-sale product information. See D. RICE, CONSUMER
TRANSACTIONS 2-24 (1975).
"watchdog" agencies which would enforce con-
sumer protection laws; 5 the Supreme Court
has re-affirmed the principle of strict criminal
liability for violations of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act6 and has left the door
open for the application of such a standard in
other areas as well; 7 federal regulatory agencies
have responded with stringent sentencing rec-
ommendations for corporate offenders who
s For example, bills which would establish an
"Agency for Consumer Advocacy" have been intro-
duced in Congress for several years. Although such
a proposal was only narrowly defeated in the 94th
Congress, the following "consumer agency" bills have
been introduced in the 95th Congress (1st Sess.): H.
7014, H. 7185, H. 6118 and H. 6437. In the 94th
Congress version, the agency was to have no direct
enforcement authority, but was to act as a centralized
consumer advocate and fact-finding body on the
federal level.
6 In United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Park], the Court sustained the
principle first set down in United States v. Dotter-
weich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), which held that no crimi-
nal intent need be shown to establish a violation of
the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970). In Park, the Court held the
president and chief executive officer of a large na-
tional food chain criminally liable for unsanitary
storage conditions in one of the company's ware-
houses by virtue of the power and responsibility of
his position. The Court found unconvincing Park's
arguments that normal operating duties, including
sanitation, had in fact been delegated to a division
vice president. Chief Justice Burger justified the
imposition of strict criminal liability, which presently
does not exist outside of the food and drug area, by
noting that the Food and Drug Act's purpose is the
protection of the public welfare, that Park had as-
sumed his duties voluntarily, and that Park had in
fact had the power to prevent and correct the viola-
tion. 421 U.S. at 672.
7 Among the factors which could determine if the
Park notion of strict criminal liability will be applied
to other areas of the law are: (1) the nature of the
public interest to be protected, (2) the nature of the
penalties already authorized for the offense, (3) the
purposes of such penalties, and (4) the legislative
history of the relevant statute. For an analysis of the
applicability of the Park principles to other federal
or state regulatory statutes, see 13 AM. CR1M. L.
REV. 299, 313-14 (1975).
Vol. 69, No. I
Printed in U.S.A.
SANCTIONS FOR CORPORATE ILLEGALITY
breach the public trust which the agencies over-
see;8 and several federal judges have invoked
the imprisonment sanction for businessmen
who violate federal laws.9
While these efforts to combat "crime in the
suites" have at times succeeded in "raising the
consciousness" of some corporate executives,10
success in actually reducing the incidence of
corporate crime has been elusive. As will be
I In November, 1976, the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice announced guidelines for its
attorneys to follow in recommending sentences for
antitrust violations. The plan calls for a standard
sentence of 18 months in prison, with various aggra-
vating and mitigating factors to be considered in
altering that term. 790 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. AA-1 (BNA 1976).
The sentencing recommendations were at least in
part a response to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1 as amended
Dec. 21, 1974 Pub. L. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708,
which, inter alia, upgraded a violation of the Sherman
Act from a misdemeanor to a felony, increased the
maximum jail sentence to three years, raised the
maximum corporate fine to $1 million and the maxi-
mum individual fine to $100,000. The purpose of
these changes was to achieve greater deterrence of
illegal conduct and practices which prevent effective
competition. Hearings on S. 782 Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Antitrust Hearings].
9 For example, in one five-month period in late
1976 and early 1977 three cases resulted in prison
sentences for the corporate executives. On November
30, 1976, Judge James B. Parsons of the Northern
District of Illinois sentenced 15 executives of paper
box board concerns to jail terms ranging from five
days to 60 days and fines ranging from $5,000 to
$35,000. United States v. Alton Box Board Co., 792
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-I (BNA 1976).
The executives and their corporations had earlier
pleaded nolo contendere to charges of price-fixing.
Federal District Judge Edward B. Boyle, Sr. of
the Eastern District of Louisiana in November, 1976,
imposed a three-month prison term on a high rank-
ing grain company executive who had pleaded guilty
to a charge of conspiring to cheat foreign customers
for his company's benefit by short weighting ships.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1976, at 20.
Finally, Judge Marvin Frankel of the Federal Dis-
trict Court in Manhattan in March, 1977, sentenced
several executives convicted of stock fraud to prison
terms in In Re Sterling Homex Corp., [1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 195,904 (S.D.N.Y.),
N.Y. Times, March 12, 1977, at 29, col. 6.
10 According to Business Week magazine, for exam-
ple, the Park case, coupled with the FDA's increased
efforts to notify heads of companies of alleged crimi-
nal violations have "succeeded spectacularly at 'exec-
utive consciousness-raising'." Business Week, May 10,
1976, at 111.
demonstrated, this failure is due in large part
to a marked lack of appropriate penalties in
the federal laws which regulate American busi-
ness. The burden is on Congress to devise new
sanctions if regulatory legislation is to be effec-
tive." This Comment discusses three major
issues which policy-makers must reckon within
the process of selecting appropriate sanctions.
First, there are the inherent moral questions:
Is the corporate crime immoral? Should moral-
ity make a difference as to whether a criminal
law ought to be used as a vehicle for social
control? Second, if corporate crime is an appro-
priate vehicle, the purposes of criminal penal-
ties must be delineated. Are we seeking only
deterrence or should we also consider retribu-
tion, education and rehabilitation in devising
sanctions? Finally, policy-makers must make as
careful a matching. as possible between the
purposes identified and the proposals for new
and reformed criminal sanctions directed at
corporate criminals.
THE PROBLEM OF MORAL NEUTRALITY
A basic theoretical problem regarding the
use of criminal sanctions for corporate illegality
is that there is no clear correlation between
what is commercially acceptable vs. legally ac-
ceptable behavior. Activities such as price-fix-
ing and bribery of foreign officials, for exam-
ple, are well-entrenched in the conventional
businessman's "moral code.' 2 Thus, as Her-
" There is no serious question today that the
federal government has broad powers to proscribe
the iriminal acts of corporations and their agents.
"The determinative test of exercise of power by
Congress is simply whether the activity sought to be
regulated is 'commerce which concerns more than
one state' and has a real and substantial relation to
the national interest." Heart of Atlanta Hotel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964).
12 A poll of the presidents of Fortune's top 1000
industrial firms showed that 60% of those responding
agreed that "many [businessmen] price-fix." In a
similar study it was found that nearly one half of
U.S. business leaders see nothing wrong with bribing
foreign officials in order to attract or retain contracts.
White Collar Justice, supra note 2, at 3.
In 1961 Harvard Business Review survey, four-
fifths of its subscribers agreed that within their own
industries there were accepted business practices
which the respondents regarded as unethical. M.
GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 283 (1971)
(Preliminary Draft for the Nader Study Group Re-
port on Antitrust Enforcement) [hereinafter cited as
CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM].
19781
bert Packer noted,13 such behavior fails "to
excite the necessary sense of indignation and
outrage that it takes for criminal sanctions to
be unsparingly applied."" Viewed only from
the somewhat narrow perspective of corporate
executives, it is not difficult to perceive why
businessmen refuse to see themselves as'crimi-
nals even when convicted, 15 and why they resist
the use of criminal sanctions for corporate
wrongdoing in general.
For the most part, the judiciary appears to
share the view that there is nothing morally
reprehensible about corporate crime, and that
is a situation which obviously impedes success-
ful prosecution of corporate offenders. Many
judges refuse, for example, to view price-fixing
that is unaccompanied by threats or coercion
as immoral conduct.' 6 More generally, Profes-
sor Henry M. Hart has commented that judges
rarely express to any defendant "with all possi-
ble solemnity ajudgment of condemnation...
in society's behalf."' Studies which show that
sentencingjudges discriminate in favor of white
'3 Late Professor of Law, Stanford University.
14 H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANC-
TION 359 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PACKER]. While
Packer did not reject the use of the criminal sanction
in the "common regulatory sphere," he did believe
that the sanction would have to be expanded in
scope if a better match between punishment and
crime is to be realized. Id. at 362.
S A former General Electric vice president who
was convicted of price-fixing and sent to prison for
his part in the massive electrical equipment price-
fixing conspiracy of the early 1960's wrote the follow-
ing before serving his jail term: "All of you know
that next Monday, in Philadelphia, I will start serving
a thirty day jail term, along with six other businessmen
for conduct which has been interpreted as being in
conflict with the complex antitrust laws." Geis, Deter-
ring Corporate Crime, in THE CONSUMER AND CORPO-
RATE AccOuNTABILITY 349 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Geis].
16 The District Court of Los Angeles, where many
antitrust cases are heard, is among the nation's most
extreme in this regard. Several judges on that court
are openl% hostile to Antitrust Division attorneys.
CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 312.
Even Judge james B. Parsons, who sentenced the
Alton Box Board defendants to prison, stated that
whether the defendants' price-fixing earned the Gov-
ernment's description of being immoral or antisocial
could only be determined from facts not available.
Sentencing Transcript, United States %. Alton Box
Board Co., 792 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. D-I
D-3, (BNA 1976) [hereinafter cited as Alton Sentenc-
ing Transcript].
'" Hart, The Aims oJ the Criminal Law. 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 401. 436-37 (1958).
collar offenders corroborate the existence of
this judicial attitude.'Y
Traditionally, it has been thought that the
general public also viewed corporate crime as
morally neutral because potential resentment
of such illegality was relatively unorganized.
Sociologist Edwin Sutherland has attributed
this lack of organization to the complexity of
the violations, their diffuse effects, their rela-
tive newness (vis-a-vis common law crimes) and
their high level of specialization.'" In addition,
Sutherland believed that the public was not
aware of the nature and extent of white collar
crime because of the de-emphasis of such crime
by the media.
20
While it does not appear that the media have
substantially altered their coverage of corporate
crime,2' an argument can be made that public
resentment is nonetheless coalescing to a point
where the public would readily accept greater
use of criminal sanctions for corporate wrong-
doing. First, the development of the consumer
movement has only been possible because of
higher levels of education and sophistication in
the population. Consumers understand the na-
ture of corporate crime, particularly when they
'" See White Collar Justice, supra note 2, at 6-7, 10-
11. One study was conducted by the U.S. Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of New York, where
many white collar criminals are prosecuted. It found
that white collar offenders receive more lenient treat-
ment "as a general rule." Id. at 7.
15 E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 49-52
(1949) [hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND].2 1 d. at 50-51. This finding was corroborated by
two studies of the news coverage surrounding the
electrical equipment price-fixing conspiracies in 1961.
Generally, the studies found that news reports of
both the pleadings and the sentencing were most
often relegated to a brief paragraph on an inner
page. See Comment, Increasing Community Control Over
Corporate Crime, 71 YALE L.J. 280 n.35 (1961).
SI A brief survey of six major newspapers (Chicago
Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New Orleans Times-Picayune,
New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Washington
Post) following the sentencing of the Alton Box Board
defendants on November 30, 1976 revealed that only
two newspapers gave the story front page status
(Wall Street Journal, New York Times), while the rest
ran comparatively brief stories in the financial sec-
tion. Interestingly, every newspaper on the day fol-
lowing the sentencing ran front page stories on the
right of Gary Gilmore to die in a Utah electric chair.
In addition, it is noteworthy that both Time and
Newsweek, as well as four of the above newspapers
covered the sentencing story in their business sec-
tions. as opposed to "national affairs" or "law" sec-
tions.
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perceive the economic and physical injury
which may flow to them as a result. 22 Second,
when the public becomes aware of white collar
crime the use of criminal sanctions is clearly
favored. Surveys indicate that people feel the
wearing of a white collar is a privilege which
should carry with it a sort of public trust which,
when violated, requires severe criminal punish-
ment.
23
There appears, then, to be a genuine lack of
consensus regarding the immorality of corpo-
rate crime. Businessmen and a large segment
of the judiciary do not equate corporate wrong-
doing with anti-social conduct, while it appears
that much of the general public disagrees. The
question is thus raised whether the criminal
law is an appropriate vehicle for social
change-here, of corporate malfeasance-
when such a moral consensus does not exist.
One view is to reject the use of the criminal law
because, it is argued, we cannot persuade peo-
ple to see conduct as wrongful simply by mak-
ing it criminal. 24 In addition, many contend
that overuse of the criminal sanction when little
moral culpability is associated with the offense
tends to dull 'any moral stigma which might
attach to the penalty and causes the public to
resent efforts to enforce the law. 25
22 For example, when the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department first established an "antitrust
hotline" in Pittsburgh to encourage citizens to report
possible violations of the antitrust laws, speculation
was that many calls would be received from shoppers
complaining of price-fixing at the retail level. Wall
St.J., Apr. 7, 1977 (Business Bulletin), at 1, col. 5.
2 The Joint Commission on Correctional Man-
power found, for instance, a strong public disposition
to sentence accountants who embezzle more harshly
than either young burglars or persons caught looting
during a riot. Geis, supra note 15, at 343. Similarly, a
1953 survey of people who were shown the sentences
actually imposed in several food adulteration cases
arising under the Food and Drug Act revealed that
78% would have imposed penaltes more severe than
those actually dispensed. Newman, Public Attitudes
Toward a Form of White Collar Crime, in WHITE COLLAR
CRIMINAL 287, 290 (G. Geis ed. 1968).
24 PACKER, supra note 14, at 359. Witness, for
example, the repeal of the eighteenth amendment
which prohibited the manufacture or sale of intoxi-
cating liquors.
23 Where this argument appears to have its greatest
merit is in the area of local public welfare laws, such
as housing codes and health regulations, where viola-
tions that are technically criminal are treated in a
very routine, almost casual manner. See F. GRAD,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW MANUAL 140 (1965).
Supporters of the view that criminal sanc-
tions are not appropriate for corporate crime
would not rely totally on a private civil enforce-
ment scheme, but have advocated a system of
"civil penalties" to accompany the traditional
civil sanctions of reparations and injunctions. 26
Civil penalties represent a legal hybrid insofar
as they are a means of punishment which do
not carry the stigma of moral culpability which
accompanies a criminal sanction. 2 Apart from
any question of morality, a system of civil
penalties would eliminate many of the proce-
dural burdens found in criminal prosecutions,
vis-A-vis civil suits.28
There are several factors, however, which
demonstrate that criminal sanctions are a viable
means of combating corporate wrongdoing and
that a purely civil enforcement system is not
necessary. First, it must be recognized that
there has never been a correlation between
morality and the criminal law. Conduct which
is generally considered immoral is often not
criminal; for example, the failure to save a
drowning person when physically able to do so
is not criminally punishable.2 9 On the other
26 See Kovel, A Camefor Civil Penalties: Air Pollution
Control, 46J. URBAN L. 153 (1968). The author argues
that in light of the "undeveloped moral sense of the
community" with regard to pollution, regulatory ef-
forts in this area should not be handicapped by th4
use of criminal sanctions.
27 A second approach taken by others who object
to the use of the criminal sanction when the element
of moral culpability is lacking would be to downgrade
the offense in some fashion. The Model Penal Code,
for example, makes a "frontal attack" on strict liability
in penal statutes-where there is absolutely no ele-
ment of moral wrongdoing-by reducing the grade
of the offense to a "violation." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.05, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). A viola-
tion is not a "crime" under the Code and no sentence
harsher than a fine, forfeiture or other civil remedy
may result.
2- There are five advantages to proceeding civilly
to enact a penalty: (1) pleading requirements are
simpler; (2) no delay is caused by a failure of the
defendant to appear-a defaultjudgment is simply
entered; (3) there is a relaxation of the burden of
proof; (4) the guarantee of a right to a jury trial is
avoided; and (5) the government can appeal if it
loses a civil action. Kovel, A Casefor Civil Penaltie% 46
J. URBAN L. 153, 156-58 (1968).
29 Contrary to the law in the United States, most
countries in western Europe have adopted legislation
which makes it a criminal offense to fail to render
help in cases of accident or necessity where there is
no danger to the'rescuer. See Dawson, Negotiorum




hand, acceptance of strict criminal liability for
public welfare offenses shows that the law will
label some conduct as criminal which is not
immoral .30 In short, it appears that when legis-
latures provide for criminal sanctions for cer-
tain acts, they often do so not because the
immediate conduct is either rightful or wrong-
ful in itself, but because they believe that some
social advantage will result.3 1 Second, empirical
evidence tends to show that moral approval by
the regulated is not a necessary condition for
compliance with the law.32 Third, there is little
danger of overuse of the criminal sanction in
the present regulation of business. Criminal
sanctions-are largely ancillary to a variety of
other authorized sanctions-including civil
30 See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 281 (1943), where the Supreme Court construed
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-92 (1938), to dispense with the traditional
element of "awareness of some wrongdoing" in find-
ing a violation of the Act. See note 6 supra and
accompanying text.
Despite judicial and legislative acceptance of strict
criminal liability, many have argued that the real
menace to society is the intentional commission of
undesirable acts, and that evil intent must remain an
element of the criminal law. See Sayre, Public Welfare
Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933); Hippard, The
Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault:
An Argument for a Constitutional Doctrine of Mens Rea,
10 Hous. L. REv. 1039 (1973).
31 Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 401,417 (1958). It can also be argued
that a good deal of criminal law is the result of
pressure from narrowly-defined groups who are
more concerned with their own self interest than
with any notion of morality. For example, city auto-
mobile dealers who are prevented from selling auto-
mobiles on Sunday by local ordinance have at times
convinced state legislatures to make the selling of
cars throughout the state on that day a crime. W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 10 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as LAFAVE & ScoTT].
11 Robert E. Lane's study of compliance with gov-
ernmental regulations in general demonstrated that
"there was no tendency to react against a wide range
of laws, no evident general antiregulation animus,"
and that it was "the position of the firm, rather than
the emotional qualities of its management, which led
it to violate." R. LANE, THE REGULATION OF Busi-
NESSMEN-SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF GOVERNMENT Eco-
NOMIC CONTROL 106 (1954). See also Ball & Friedman,
The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of
Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 197, 208-11 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Ball &
Friedman] ("grumbling acceptance of the income
tax, food and drug laws and the antitrust laws serve
the purposes of the legal order perfectly well; wild
enthusiasm is not necessary").
penalties-in most federal regulatory legisla-
tion,33 and are generally reserved for repeated
offenses or egregious violations.3 4 Thus, from
this pragmatic perspective the criminal sanction
can be seen as a viable weapon for counteract-
ing corporate wrongdoing.
THE PURPOSES OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
Once the criminal law is accepted as a set of
techniques which can be manipulated for social
ends,35 the question becomes what precisely
our goals are when we impose a criminal sanc-
tion. As with any type of crime, no unitary and
comprehensive theory exists for explaining the
purposes of criminal sanctions for corporate
crime. Rather, four main theories have been
relied upon: general deterrence, specific deter-
rence, retribution and education. The goals of
rehabilitation and incapacitation are generally
not regarded as applicable to individual white
collar offenders. However, several proposals
for reform of criminal sanctions directed at the
corporate entity seem to be directed at these
purposes.36 Unfortunately, there is a basic lack
of empirical research on the extent to which
any goal is actually realized.3 7 This fact ought
3 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2069 (a)(1) (1974), which provides for a
maximum $500,000 civil penalty. See generally, Note,
Statutory Penalties, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1092 (1938).
34 The Food and Drug Administration's policy, for
example, is to proceed criminally only as a last resort.
O'Keefe & Shapiro, Personal Criminal Liability Under
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 30 FOOD,
DRUG & CosM. L.J. 5, 28 (1975). Less than 10% of
the actions taken by the FDA in 1976 were criminal
prosecutions, with seizures, injunctions and recalls
comprising the balance. See, e.g., FOOD DRUG Cos. L.
REP. (CCH) $ 37,074 (FDA Enforcement Report
April-September, 1976). Business Week reported, how-
ever, that the agency notified 175 heads of companies
of alleged criminal violations in the last six months
of 1975 alone. Business Week, May 10, 1976, at 111.
Similarly, approximately two-thirds of the cases
brought by the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department are civil suits seeking to prevent and
restrain violations of the antitrust laws. CLOSED EN-
TERPRISE SYsTEM, supra note 12, at 340.
3 Ball & Friedman,supra note 32, at 211.
36 For discussion, see text accompanying notes 94-
127 infra.
37 This fact has been noted by academicians and
judges alike. See, e.g., Kadish, Some Observations on
the Use of the Criminal Sanction in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 434 (1963) [here-
inafter cited as Kadish]; Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S.
141, 148 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
For a detailed proposal for how such empirical re-
[Vol. 69
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not, however, to keep policy-makers from artic-
ulating and applying the ends sought to be
achieved by means of criminal sanctions-how-
ever theoretical-when they devise new sanc-
tions for corporate crime.
General deterrence is regarded as the pri-
mary justification for use of criminal sanctions
for corporate crime. Academicians, 3 all levels
of the judiciary,39 enforcement officials 40 and
Congress4' have accepted the idea that the use
of the criminal penalty is a legitimate means of
checking an offense not yet committed, by
associating with it a deterrent threat. The de-
gree to which threats can be effectively used to
induce compliance with the law is determined
by the responses of the threatened audiences.
Six interrelated variables are thought to influ-
ence responsiveness to a legal threat:4 (1) dif-
search should proceed, see F. ZIMRING & G. HAWK-
INS, DETERRENCE 195 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
ZIMRING].
38 See, e.g., PACKER, supra note 14, at 356 (1968);
Geis, Criminal Penalties for Corporate Criminals, 8 CRIM.
L. BULL. 377, 380 (1972).
Philosophers have at times placed both general
and specific deterrence into a utilitarian model of
criminal sanctions. Punishment, which is regarded
by utilitarians as a prima facie evil, is thus justifiable
only insofar as it prevents an even greater evil from
occurring,-such as physical or economic harm. Note,
Criminal Liability Without Fault: A Philosophical Perspec-
tive, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1517, 1535 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as A Philoiophical Perspective).
39 In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974),
Justice Stewart wrote:
An important function of the corrections system
is the deterrence of crime. The premise that by
confining criminal offenders in a facility where
they are isolated from the rest of society, a
condition that most people presumably find
undesirable, they and others will be deterred
from committing additional criminal offenses.
For the views of many judges who likewise accept
the value of punishment for its general deterrence
purposes, see Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D.
231, at 282-84 (1959) (under the auspices of thejudicial Conference of the United States).4 0See, e.g., Government Sentencing Memoran-
dum, United States v. Alton Box Board Co., 784
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. D-1 (BNA 1976).
41 For example, the legislative history of the Anti-
trust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976), shows that the purpose of the increase in the
criminal sanctions there for antitrust violations was
to better deter illegal conduct which prevents effec-
tive competition. Antitrust Hearings, supra note 8, at
4.
42 See generally, ZIMRING, supra note 37, at 91-194.
The authors derived their variables from findings in
experimental psychology.
ferences among persons; (2) types of threatened
behavior; (3) communication of the threat; (4)
types of threatened consequences; (5) variations
in the severity of the consequences; and (6) the
credibility of the threat. Application of these
variables to the corporate context tends to
support general deterrence as a sound basis
for criminal sanctions for corporate illegality.
First, in terms of differences among people
the following characteristics hale been identi-
fied as making a person especially responsive
to legal threats: future orientation, risk avoid-
ance, a high level of socialization, respect for
authority and high socio-economic status.43 Ob-
viously, these traits are characteristic of most
persons who occupy the corporate suites. The-
oretically, then, persons who hold positions of
leadership in corporations would seem to be a
particularly threat-sensitive audience.
Second, the type of behavior threatened by
the criminal sanction will influence the effec-
tiveness of that sanction. In particular, the
"emotional context" of the crime is thought to
be significant in this regard. Thus, deliberate
corporate crimes, such as price-fixing and
product safety violations, where willfullness
must be shown to secure a criminal conviction,
should be most responsive to legal threats. This
is due to the fact that the criminal is not acting
on impulse and has time to ponder the legal
consequences of his actions.
44
Third, even if businessmen do not always
heed the threat of criminal punishment, it does
appear that the threat is often communicated
to them. Businessmen reacted swiftly and ve-
hemently, for example, to United States v. Park45
and to recent attempts to increase corporate
penalties through reform of the Federal Crim-
inal Code.46 There is little doubt that the in-
43 ld. at 98-127.
44 An argument can be made that even violations
of the Food and Drug Act are deliberate crimes,
despite the fact that the violator need have no evil
intent to be convicted. This is due to the FDA's
practice of sending several warning letters in advance
of actual criminal prosecution. In Park, for example,
the company president was indeed on notice of the
sanitary violations before the criminal charges were
brought. Merrill, The Park Case, 30 FooD, DRUG. &
CosM. LJ. 683, 684 (1975).
45 For the negative reaction of a Washington, D.C.,
attorney specializing in food and drug law, see Lam-
bert, Dancing With the Gorilla, 30 FOOD, DRUG &
Cosm. LJ. 410 (1975).
46 Businessmen almost uniformly opposed the pro-
creased use of the jail sanction for white collar
offenders has stirred some serious concern as
Well.
The fourth variable affecting responsiveness
to legal threats is the type of consequences
which can flow from a criminal conviction.
Businessmen will clearly not respond to a threat
if the consequences of ignoring that threat do
not truly alter their lifestyle. However, if the
corporate executive realizes that actual eco-
nomic deprivation, a loss of privileges, or par-
ticularly, stigmitization could result, he might
be more responsive.
Next, variations in the severity of the conse-
quences are thought to have some influence on
the response to threats. There is, however,
much disagreement as to exactly how this factor
operates. Using a strictly economic analysis,
general deterrence would be achieved by a
punishment set at such a level that the cost of
criminal activity is greater than the value of
that activity to the perpetrator. 47 Insofar as the
motives and effects of corporate crime can be
translated into economic terms, 48 such an
analysis would seem to be helpful in assessing
the efficacy of general deterrence as a goal of
corporate criminal sanctions. However, where
no motive at all is required to secure a criminal
conviction, as in strict liability corporate crimes,
posals related to corporate crime which were embod-
ied in S. 1 and S. 1400 in the 93d and 94th Congresses.
See, e.g.. Testimony on S. I and S. 1400 Before the
Subcomm. on Crin. Lau,, and Procedure5 oJ the Senate
Comm. on theJudiciaor'Y, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., 5586-608
(1973) (statement of Mark Crane).
17 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
357-65 (1972) [hereinafter cited as POSNER]. Posner
argues that the economic content of the law is no-
where clearer than in the rationale of criminal pun-
ishment. His formula for deterrence is premised on
the assumption that "people engage in acts that will
yield them the most value net of cost." Id. at 357.
41 In Comment, Increasing Community Control Over
Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71
YA.E L.J. 280 (1961). the author advances the follow-
ing hypothesis for corporate crime which is econom-
ically motivated, such as price-fixing or bribery of
foreign officials:
The rate of acquisitive corporate crime engaged
in on behalf of any [widely-held] corporation
will a) vary directly with the expectation of net
gain to that corporation from the crime, and
will b) var) inversely with the certainty and
severity of the impact with which the criminal
sanction personally falls upon these who formu-
late corporate policy.
Id. at 282.
this analysis would seem to have less value.4 9
Up to this point, the discussion of the varia-
bles related to general deterrence might seent
to indicate that criminal sanctions have consid-
erable potential to deter corporate wrongdo-
ing. Why,°then, is corporate crime increasing?
The answer appears to lie at least in part in the
final variable, the credibility of the sanction
itself. For a criminal sanction to be credible, a
two-step process must take place. First, the
would-be criminal must believe that there is a
reasonable probability of being caught. Unfor-
tunately, this probability is considerably less
than one considering the ability to conceal and
the increasing complexity of much white collar
crime,"0 as well as the inadequate law enforce-
ment resources devoted to the problem of cor-
porate crime." Second, the potential criminal
must believe that if he is apprehended there is a
high probability of being seriously punished.
This probability is likewise very low for corpo-
rate crime because, as will be shown, either the
punishment itself is not serious or, even if it is
substantial, there is little likelihood of its impo-
sition.
Under the theory of specific deterrence the
goal of criminal punishment is to deter the
criminal himself, rather than others, from com-
mitting further crimes. This is accomplished
by giving him an unpleasant experience that
he will not wish to endure again. 2 Although
enforcement officials claim that criminal pen-
alties are not really aimed at the person stand-
ing before the judge, 53 some salutary effects
49 For example, Zimring and Hawkins reject the
price system model which Posner favors. They feel
that the analogy is incomplete because a potential
buyer will know the price of a product before making
a purchase decision. No such assumption can be
made, they argue, about the potential criminal's
knowledge of the consequences threatened for par-
ticular criminal behavior. ZIMRING, supra note 37, at
194-200.
50 Most securities crimes today, for example, relate
to inadequate disclosure, and thus are more difficult
to detect than manipulative schemes. See White Collar
Justice, supra note 2, at 4.
s1 The Los Angeles U.S. Attorney's Office is a
typical situation. For a district of almost 10 million
people only eight out of 55 criminal assistants are
designated to specialize in complex white collar crime
cases. Id. at 3-4.
52 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 31. at 22.
53 The former head of the Antitrust Division, Don-
aid 1. Baker, stated that the stiffer penalties his
agency sought for antitrust violators were designed
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have nevertheless been shown when corporate
executives have indeed been seriously pun-
ished. For example, a former General Electric
vice president who was convicted of price-fixing
and was sent to prison for his part in the
massive electrical equipment price-fixing con-
spiracy of the early 1960's stated that "I would
starve before I would [price-fix] again," be-
cause of "what I have been through and what I
have done to my family. 'H
Despite the emphasis given to general and
specific deterrence -as the primary theories of
punishment, a very discernible thread of the
oldest theory, retribution, also underlies the
use of the criminal sanction for white collar
offenders. Under this theory, punishment is
imposed by society on the criminal in an effort
to vindicate its wrath.3 5 Thus, findings that the
public favors harsher penalties for white collar
offenders who breach a public trust might be
an indication that the public wants retribution.
In two recent cases where corporate executives
were sentenced to prison for violation of fed-
eral laws, the sentencingjudges explicitly stated
that a notion of "just deserts" was at the root of
the imposition of prison sentences.56 From a
legislative perspective, recent efforts to reform
the sentencing process in federal courts have
identified retribution as the principal justifica-
tion for imprisonment, with rehabilitation only
a beneficial by-product.5 7 As persuasive as this
to influence the person who is in a conspiracy and
may want to get out, or one who is thinking of
engaging in price-fixing.
' Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., 17067 (1961).
m Philosophically, this theory is opposite of utilitar-
ianism, with its emphasis on society being ordered
such that the good are happy and the wicked suffer,
each in proportion to his moral desert. A Philosophical
Perspective, supra note 38, at 1560.
'United States v. Alton Box Board Co., 792
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. D-1 (BNA 1976); Alton
Sentencing Transcript, supra note 16, at D-3; In re
Sterling Homex, [1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,904. In Sterling Homex Judge
Marvin Frankel stated that one reason for his impo-
sition of the prison sentences in that stock fraud case
was "the notion ofjust deserts" that called for punish-
ing people who do serious wrong. He added, "We
don't use the word retribution anymore, but that's
what it means." N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1977, at 29,
col. 6.
5' Sentencing Guidelines Bill, S. 2699, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976). See also, Kennedy, Criminal Sentencing:
A Game of Chance, 60JUD. 208 (1976).
idea of "squaring accounts" might be, however,
it should not become the sole justification for
the use of criminal sanctions directed at corpo-
rate crime. The desire for retribution is, after
all, basically an emotion, and to have to quan-
tify and apply so yolatile a factor in a criminal
sanction would be difficult indeed.
Under the education theory of criminal pun-
ishment, the publicity which accompanies the
imposition of a criminal sanction serves to in-
culcate a sense of morality-or at least aware-
ness-in the public that might otherwise be
lacking.58 At the present time, this purpose for'
criminal sanctions can only be realized as a'
positive by-product which occurs when the
mass media publicizes an indictment, trial or
sentencing proceeding. Although one can ar-
gue that there is increasing awareness of'cor-
porate crime among the public, it is doubtful
that this can be attributed to publicity sur-
rounding the use of criminal sanctions for
corporate wrongdoing, considering the media's
general de-emphasis of such crime. 9 Still, this
potential for added awareness which could flow
from the use of criminal sanctions ought to be
considered in the process of shaping new crim-
inal sanctions.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS
Sanctions Directed Against the Corporation
Under present federal case law corporations
can be held criminally liable for statutory viola-
tions regardless of whether the statute specifi-
cally mentions corporations as subject to its
sanctions. 60 The purpose of a sanction directed
at a corporation-be it criminal prosecution,
private civil actions, injunctions or other civil
penalties-is to control the corporation through
58 LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 31, at 23.
1s See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
60. Many federal regulatory statutes hold only "per-
sons" subject to their criminal sanctions. However, I
U.S.C. § 1 defines "person" as including "corpora-
tions, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, joint stock companies, as well as individ-
uals," unless the context of the statute dictates other-
wise. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
In civil law countries, the idea of societas delinquere
non potest-"the corporation can do no wrong"-is
still recognized. Thus, anyone who acts for a corpo-
ration knows that he or she cannot escape criminal
liability by shifting the blame to the corporate entity.
Mueller, Menw Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PrrT. L.
REv. 21, 28 (1957).
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threats to its profits. Presumably, then,
whether a particular sanction has any deterrent
value will depend on whether the costs of the
criminal sanction to the corporation outweigh
the benefits of continuing the illegality."
As presently administered, corporate fines
lack credibility as profit-diminishing sanctions.
This is due largely to the exceedingly low
maximum penalties found in most statutes,
relative to both the assets of the offender 62 and
the extent of the damage caused by the miscon-
duct. Moreover, these maximum amounts are
rarely imposed by judges and juries. This
failure to penalize corporate offenders to the
maximum extent possible could be due in part
to the use of the nolo contendere plea. Although
legally a plea of no contest can subject the
defendant to the same fine as if he had pleaded
guilty, 65 in fact, judges sentence far more leni-
ently after a nolo plea than after a conviction
which follows a plea of either guilty or not
guilty."
Not only is the criminal fine incapable of
61 See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
62 For example, the effect of the $437,500 fine
levied on General Electric for its part in the electrical
equipment price-fixing conspiracy was roughly
equivalent to a $3.00 parking fine for a man with an
income of $15,000 per year. CLOSED ENTERPRISE
SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 324.
" Although the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act did raise the maximum corporate fine to one
million dollars for violations of the Sherman Act,
even this amount appears insignificant when one
realizes that some seven billion dollars of commerce
was affected by the electrical equipment price-fixing
conspiracy. Id. at 323.
For Food and Drug Act violations this contrast
becomes even more pronounced if one considers the
economic and physical damage which can result in
relation to the maximum $1,000 fine. 21 U.S.C. §
333(a) (1970). See note 3 supra.
6 In the Alton case, for instance, 13 of the 22
corporate defendants received fines less than even
the previous $50,000 maximum under the Sherman
Act. TRADE REG. REP. 53,645-46. In the electri-
cal equipment case, the average corporate fine was
only $16,500. CLOSED ENTERPRISES SYSTEM, supra
note 12, at 323.
"s Cf. United States v. Frankfort Distillers, 324
U.S. 293 (1945); Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S.
451, 455 (1926).
66 In the'history of the antitrust laws, for example,
73% of all convictions have been obtained via nolo
contendere pleas. Moreover, between 1960 and 1970
courts accepted nolo pleas in antitrust cases in 95% of
the cases where the government opposed such a
plea. CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at
308-11.
significantly diminishing a corporation's profits
directly, but it also fails to do so indirectly by
damage to the company's goodwill. It is likely
that the media's unwillingness to report fully
the use of criminal sanctions for corporate
crime which is at fault here.6 7 Theoretically, if
consumers were made aware of corporate ille-
gality when a criminal sanction was imposed
they might be more inclined to take their busi-
ness to more responsible companies. In this
manner, criminal sanctions could supplement
the efforts of the consumer movement in fight-
ing corporate criminality. At the present time,
however, any cost/benefit analysis for most
major corporations would reveal that the cor-
porate fine amounts to little more than a rea-
sonable license fee-just another cost of doing
business imposed by the government. s8
Sanctions Directed Against the Individual
In light of the inadequacies of the present
system of criminal sanctions for the corpora-
tions, prosecutions of individuals might seem
to be the answer to more effective enforcement
of corporate criminal laws. In particular, the
stigmitization that follows an individual prose-
cution is thought to be an excellent general
and specific deterrent for white collar offend-
ers.69 However, despite the potential value and
relative ease of proceeding criminally against a
"person" under most statutes, criminal sanc-
tions directed at the corporation's policy-mak-
ers have proved to be largely ineffectual.
Practically speaking, the major obstacle to
67 See note 23 supra.
71 YALE LJ. at 287. Christopher Stone argues
that in general legal threats constitute only a small
range of the threats that a corporation faces in
dealing with the outside world. Moreover, he notes
that having profits cut by a law suit does not involve
the same "loss of face" as losses attributable to other
causes, such as a poor marketing decision. C. STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDS 39-40 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as STONE].
69 Zimring and Hawkins note that often the fact
that the individual was punished is what is considered
disgraceful, rather than the commission of the crime
itself. ZIMRING, supra note 37, at 190-94. In the Alton
case, the individual defendants argued prior to sent-
encing that there was no need for Judge Parsons to
impose prison sentences since "mere 'conviction' of
an antitrust offense carries a 'devastating result."'
787 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-13 (BNA
1976). Note also, the statement of the former Gen-
eral Electric executive who had spent time in prison.
Note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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individual prosecutions is that the corporate
entity tends to conceal the real actors in a given
situation. In many cases, this has raised prob-
lems of identifying which persons in the cor-
porate structure are actually responsible for
the wrongful act.70 A somewhat more perplex-
ing problem is the not infrequent phenomenon
of a jury convicting a corporate defendant, yet
acquitting an individuil for the same offense
at the same trial. The reason for this appears
to be that jurors tend to separate conduct which
they condemn from the individual with whom
they often sympathize.7 1 Finally, judicial hostil-
ity to criminal prosecutions of white collar
offenders, and their acceptance of the nolo
contendere plea, are significant bars to effective
individual prosecutions.
The fine is the most common criminal sanc-
tion imposed upon the individual convicted of
corporate crime. However, even apart from
the general problems of establishing complicity
within the corporate structure and the attitudes
of judges and jurors, individual fines will re-
main an ineffective deterrent as long as defend-
ants can be indemnified. Not only are the by-
laws of most major corporations extremely lib-
eral in their basic indemnification provisions,7 2
but more than seventeen states today permit
70 In the electrical equipment cases, for example,
"the high policy makers of General Electric and other
companies involved escaped personal accountability
for a criminal conspiracy . . . despite the belief of
the trial judge and most observers that these higher
officials either knew of and condoned these activities
[price-fixing] or were willfully ignorant of them."
Kadish, supra note 37, at 431.
In Alton Box Board, however, the Government
apparently had little difficulty pinpointing who
within each of the 23 manufacturers was responsible
for that company's participation in the bid-rigging
conspiracy. Those identified ranged from persons of
the chief executive officer level down to the product
vice president level. See Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1976, at
4.
71 Ball & Friedman, supra note 32, at 219. Several
courts have commented on this phenomenon. See,
e.g., United States v. Austen-Bagley Corporation, 31
F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863
(1929), where the judge exclaimed, "How an intelli-
gent jury could have acquitted any of the defendants
we cannot conceive."
712 General Motors, for example, indemnifies all its
directors and officers "against any and all judgments,
fines, amounts paid in settlements and reasonable
expenses, including attorney fees." General Motors
Corp., By-Laws No. 31, "Indemnification of Direc-
tors and Officers."
corporations to purchase indemnification in-
surance on behalf of their directors and offi-
cers.7 3 As written, the provisions of several
state statutes, including the Delaware General
Corporation Law,74 would permit such insur-
ance to cover any wrongful act, regardless of
whether the corporation would have the power
to indemnify the individual "directly" under
the statute. 5
Admittedly, corporations might not be able
to attract qualified leadership if there were not
indemnification insurance. In addition, there
is nothing to stop the corporation from making
a larger compensation arrangement with the
executive and letting him pay for this insurance
himself. Despite the validity of these argu-
ments, they should not outweigh the fact that
overbroad indemnification statutes, such as
that in Delaware, not only reduce the deterrent
effect of the criminal fine on the individual,
but in the process create the possibility that a
corporation can insure its executives against
their own intentional wrongdoing.
The other sanction available in nearly every
13 Although the corporation laws of only 17 states
authorize indemnification insurance, a 1974 survey
of the Fortune 500 list revealed that 80% of those
companies carried such insurance. TAMING THE
GIANT CORPORATION, supra note 3, at 107.
74 At least one-half of the major industrial corpo-
rations are incorporated in Delaware. See R. NADER,
M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTrrtrrZtONAuZING
THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR FEDERAL CHAR-
TERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 501-02 (1976).
' Section 145(a) of the Delaware statute permits a
corporation to indemnify an officer or director
against expenses and fines in a criminal action only
if he acted in good faith and in a manner he reason-
ably believed to be in the best interest of the corpo-
ration, and if he had no reasonable cause to believe
his action was unlawful.
However, § 145(g) then permits the corporation:
[T]o purchase and maintain insurance on behalf
of every person who is or was a director, officer,
employee or agent of the corporation ... against
any liability asserted against him and incurred
by him in any such capacity, or arising out of his
status as such, whether or not the corporation would
have the power to indemnify him against any such
liability under the provisions of this section.
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 145(a), (g) (emphasis added).
Thus, following the provisions of the statute liter-
ally, insurance could be purchased which would
insulate executives not only from negligence but
from deliberate violations of federal safety, civil
rights, environmental, tax or antitrust laws as well.
TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION, supra note 3, at
108.
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statute that provides criminal penalties for in-
dividuals convicted of corporate crime is im-
prisonment. However, this sanction is almost
never imposed, largely because judges and ju-
ries are particularly loathe to sentence an indi-
vidual corporate offender to prison.7 6 As a
result, for example, a higher percentage of
persons convicted of violating the migratory
bird laws are sentenced to prison for longer
terms, than those who violate the antitrust
laws.7 7 Moreover, even when corporate officials
go to jail, prosecutors complain that they are
sent to the relatively "luxurious" prison facili-
ties.78
Ironically, all of this occurs at a time when
the available evidence shows that the threat of
a prison term, even at a facility designed for
low-risk white collar criminals, could well be
the single most effective deterrent for corpo-
rate crime. Theoretically, the unpleasantness
which accompanies a stay in prison is anathema
to a corporate executive. Apart from the very
significant stigma of a criminal conviction,79
the offender faces a marked invasion of his
privacy as well as a deprivation of his opportu-
nity to make a living. In addition, a felony
conviction can mean a loss of privileges such as
the right to vote, the right to hold public office
and the right to practice certain occupations or
professions.8 0 In sum, for the corporate of-
fender, presumably highly responsive to others'
76 "[E]ven when the evidence is strong [against an
individual white collar defendant], a form of jury
nullification can occur, where the jurors realize that
a well-dressed, white, wealthy, articulate father of
three, might actually go to jail with unkempt, non-
white poor, uneducated street criminals." CLOSED
ENTERPRISE SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 317.
This statistic was revealed by the former head
of the Antitrust Division, Donald I. Baker, when he
announced the Division's new sentencing guides,
which proposed a standard sentence for price-fixers
of 18 months in prison. 790 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. AA-l (BNA 1976). See note 8supra.
78 Many white collar criminals convicted of federal
offenses are, in fact, sentenced to the Allenwood
Federal Prison Camp, a low-security facility with no
walls, fences, barred windows or even locked doors
to keep the inmates from leaving. See White Collar
Justice, supra note 2, at 4-5.
1a See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
80 E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY
309 (8th ed. 1970). The right to vote, for example, is
lost by conviction for almost all felonious or infamous
crimes in all states except Indiana, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire and Vermont. Id.
opinions about him, the threat of such demean-
ing social sanctions is especially effective.
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A number of remedies recently have been
suggested to improve the present inadequate
network of criminal sanctions directed at cor-
porate offenders. In this section the effective-
ness and feasibility of several of these proposals
will be examined, keeping in mind the potential
purposes of the sanctions: general deterrence,
specific deterrence, retribution, education, in-
capacitation and rehabilitation. A basic prob-
lem in the criminal enforcement of federal
regulatory legislation today is the fact that
judges and juries do not impose even the cur-
rently available criminal sanctions upon corpo-
rate offenders in the same manner as they do
regular criminals. While this phenomenon is
certainly related to the moral neutrality of
corporate crime, it can also be attributed to
two additional factors. First, there is no uni-
formity among the penalties provided in fed-
eral statutes regulating business.81 This lack of
uniformity can in turn be explained by the fact
that laws have been drafted over time by differ-
ent Congresses with different views as to the
purposes of the criminal sanction and its place
in the statute's total enforcement scheme.
Congress could do much to alleviate the
problem by providing a reasoned range of pen-
alties in new criminal sanctions. While the
range of alternatives should be wide enough to
enable the sentencing judge to make the pun-
ishment fit the criminal, 2 the range itself
should be set within bounds which reflect the
legislators' view of the purposes of the sanction
as well as the moral reprehensibility of the
81 In a study of the enforcement mechanisms
found in 28 federal "public welfare" statutes, no
common thread was found to explain the variation
in the type and degree of the penalties used in the
laws. O'Keefe & Shapiro, Personal Criminal Liability
Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 30
FOOD, DRUG & COSM. L.J. 33-38 (1975).
82 In the American Bar Association's Standards
Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures,
it is recommended that authority to determine a
sentence should be vested in the trial judge and not
in the jury, and that the legislature should not fix
specific sentences which would be imposed regardless
of the circumstances. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTER-
NATIVES AND PROCEDURES 342 (1974) (hereinafter
cited as ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS].
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crime. For example, assuming that Congress
views criminal violations of the Food and Drug
Lawm and the Consumer Product Safety Act8 4
as roughly equivalent,8 5 the maximum criminal
fine for each should likewise be roughly the
same. Presently, however, a violator of the
Consumer Product Safety Act is subject to a
S50,000 maximum criminal fine, whereas a vi-
olator of the Food and Drug Act is subject to a
maximum fine of only $1000.
The second explanation for the disparity in
sentences which operates in favor of white
collar offenders is that in general there is no
list of criteria set down that a sentencing judge
can use to decide which penalty to impose and
to what degree. Useful criteria for corporate
criminals would include the purposes of the
criminal sanction for the particular crime or
class of corporate offenses, as well as factors
related to the defendant himself, such as level
of responsibility, size of the corporation 86 and
remorse and rehabilitation. There are a num-
ber of ways a set of criteria might be developed.
Congress could establish an independent ad-
ministrative agency which would establish spe-
cific, fixed sentence ranges for similar defend-
ants who commit similar crimes. 7 Alterna-
tively, sentencing "institutes" for judges could
be held to perform this function. 8 A third
possibility is that each regulatory agency would
promulgate specific sentencing guidelines for
violations of the laws they enforce.
89
n21 U.S.C. §333 (1970).
15 U.S.C. §2070 (Supp. 1975).
Arguably, both violations carry the same level
of moral opprobrium and are capable of causing
considerable physical and economic damage. The
public interest at stake in public welfare offenses
such as these has traditionally justified the use of
harsh criminal sanctions. See generally Sayre, Public
Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1933).
" The size of the corporation would presumably
determine the amount of commerce affected by the
illegal act.
87 Such an agency would be established by at least
seven bills which have been introduced in the 95th
Congress (Ist Sess.): S. 181, S. 204, H. 1182, H. 2312,
H. 7690, H. 9307 and H. 5344.
8 ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 82, at
349. The ABA also recommends that sentencing
councils be established at which different judges of
the same court could discuss the most desirable
sentences for particular defendants prior to sentenc-
ing. Id.
'9 In November. 1976, the Antitrust Division an-
nounced such guidelines for price-fixers. See note 8
supra.
Apart from efforts to establish sentencing
criteria independent of actual cases, there
should also be a requirement that sentencing
proceedings be made a matter of public rec-
ord.90 This might promote a more reasoned
sentencing opinion by the judge and could
ensure a greater degree of consistency among
sentencing judges. Similarly, appellate review
of sentences 9' would promote greater rational-
ity of sentences as well as respect for the system
in general.92
Sanctions Directed Against the Coiporation
Fines
For corporate fines to serve equity and the
purposes of deterrence, they must be calibrated
to both the magnitude of the harm caused as
well as the size of the corporation. The latter
factor could be provided for by replacing abso-
lute maximum fines with fines set at a fixed
percentage of a corporation's assets or profits
for a given period of time. For example, a fine
could be set at ten percent of the company's
gross sales receipts for the period covered by
the indictment.93 Such a method avoids the
possible unfairness to small corporations which
could result if maximum amounts were simply
increased.
Taking into account the gradient of the vic-
tim's harm in corporate fines is an idea that
has received much support from commenta-
tors.94 Moreover, this principle was incorpo-
9°See ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note
82, at 375-76.
9 Appellate review of sentences would be estab-
lished by H. 7245, 95th Congress (1st Sess.), intro-
duced by Rep. Rodino.
92 ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 82, at
407, 412-13 (1974). In addition, appellate review
could guard against excessive sentences and would
better focus the issues on the appellate level in
general since many appeals are now taken because
the defendant is dissatisfied with his sentence.
93 "In Common Market nations such as West Ger-
many, antitrust and other laws now impose fines on
the basis of a percentage of the gross annual sales or
profits of the firm, rather than in stated currency
amounts.. . ." TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION,
supra note 3, at 250.
'4 See, e.g., 71 YALE L.j. at 297-300. The author
argues that a civil attachment proceeding should
accompany a criminal proceeding against a corporate
offender whereby the government could recover
from the convicted corporation all profits illegally
earned. The government would then be obliged to
return to any injured party compensation for any
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rated into the ill-fated S. 1 and S. 1400 of the
93d and 94th Congresses. 5 Adduced as evi-
dence at trial, factors such as personal injury,
property damage, or loss caused by the illegal
act, or the pecuniary benefit derived, could go
into the calculation of the fine. The ultimate
figure could serve as the upper boundary for
the fine," or, -as Posner suggests, could be
divided by the probability of detection and
successful prosecution in that type of case to
set the exact amount of the fine.
97
The principal disadvantages of this type of
system are the bookkeeping difficulties, partic-
ularly with the Posner method, and the prob-
len of coordination with private civil suits."
Moreover, it has been argued that a basic flaw
in any sanction directed at the corporate entity
is that the real punishment is visited upon
shareholders, creditors and eventually the pub-
lic if the fine is translated into higher prices.
Although it may well be unrealistic to think
damages which lie can prove resulted proximately
fiom the crime. Id. at 297-98.
The Model Penal Code authorizes a fine of up to
double the offender's gain. MODEL PENAL CODE §
6.03(5y(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
95 S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 1400, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. I and
S. 14001. S. 1400 provided that a fine could be set for
an amount up to the gross gain derived or twice the
gross loss caused, whichever is greater. S. 1400 at §
2201(c). In November, 1977, a somewhat smaller ver-
sion of S. I and S. 1400 was reported out of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary in the form of S.
1437. It is expected to reach the Senate floor in early
1978. A companion bill. H. 6869, has been introduced
in the House.
'
6See, e.g.. .IODEL PENAL CODE §6.03(5), supra
note 95.
17 l'hus, the damages in a partictlar case will
exceed the losses to victims in that case, but if the
apprehension rate was estimated correctly, the sum
of the damages awarded in all such cases will equal
the sum of the losses of al the victims. For example,
if there is a .25 probability of apprehension and
successful prosecution for a particular corporate
crime, and the actual damiges were $100.000, the
amount of the fine would be S100,000/.25, or
S400,000. Posner feels that the private treble damage
remedy available under §4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §4. is a step in the right direction, but is
too rigid to be applied in all circumstances. POSNER,
,upra note 47. at 357-65.
98 At least one observer felt that the alternative
fines set out in S. 1 and S. 1400 would have a
particularly adverse impact on the treble damage
suit renaedy under the antitrust laws. Hearings before
the Subcomm. an Criminal Lanws and Piocedures of the
Senate Coan. an the Judiciary on S. I and S. 1400, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 5605 (1973) (statement of Mark
Crane).
that shareholders or creditors have any signifi-
cant direct control over corporate policy in the
modern publicly-held corporation,99 an argu-
ment can be made that consumers have such
control, albeit indirect. Assuming there is com-
petition in the convicted corporation's industry,
prices cannot rise to absorb the fine. If this
occurs, profits will go down, debt and equity
financing will become difficult, expansion will
be curtailed, and investors will look for a more
law-abiding corporation.
Formal Publicity
Under this proposal corporations would be
required to give some sort of notice of a crimi-
nal conviction to the public in general, or at
least to those who might be financially inter-
ested. The notice could take the form of adver-
tisements in appropriate media, or required
clauses in contracts and other corporate docu-
ments. Precedents already exist to a limited
extent. The Food and Drug Act requires that
the FDA give public notice of all criminal
prosecutions, 0° and this is reportedly an effec-
tive deterrent within the industry.' In the
labor relations field the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has at times required employers
guilty of "massive" unfair labor practices to
post notice of the Board's order, as well as to
mail the order to the individual employees."'
2
Such requirements have the effect of impress-
ing upon the employees the seriousness of the
employer's offense.
The major drawback of the formal publicity
sanction is, however, that it will be very difficult
to predict the effect of the sanction. Negative
consumer reaction to an advertisement could
well punish the corporation beyond the damage
actually done. Conversely, the corporation
9 As documented by Berle and Means, sharehold-
ers in the modern corporation have "in fact surren-
dered any theoretical ability they might have to
change management or alter corporate policy." A.
BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY. 277-87 (1934). Indeed, very few
shareholder proposals, the major method of effecting
shareholders democracy, are ever passed at annual
corporate meetings. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 910 (1961).
10021 U.S.C. §375(a) (1970).
' ' Note, Developments in the Law: The Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARV. L. REV., 632, 694
(1954).
1 J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
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would be free to counter the adverse publicity
with a barrage of positive image-oriented ad-
vertising.
Corporate Rehabilitation
While rehabilitation has been a popular the-
ory for individual punishment, 3 it has not
been applied to the corporate offender. Two
proposals have been advanced which would
provide "treatment" for the convicted corpora-
tion in order to "return" it to society so re-
formed that it will not commit further crimes.
The first, corporate probation, would require
the establishment of a public trusteeship
whereby the corporation is allowed to continue
in business as long as it promises to fulfill
certain conditions. Modest precedent for such
a procedure comes from a federal court in the
Northern District of Illinois where the court
stipulated that if an oil company did not correct
an oil spillage problem within forty-five days, a
special probation officer would be appointed
who would have the powers of a trustee under
the supervision of the court, and could ensure
that steps were being taken to correct the
problem.10 4 However, for any federal sanction
to be effective, where the ultimate threat is the
revocation of a state-granted corporate charter,
the inherent federalism confict must be reck-
oned with. A federal charter to replace the
current system of state charters for corpora-
tions is one solution.10 5 A less sweeping remedy
would be to establish prosecutors who would
103 See, e.g., Allen, CriminalJustice, Legal Values and
the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 226-32
(1959).
'0 United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d
58 (7th Cir. 1972) (referring to the district court
decision). Interestingly, it was Judge Parsons who
devised this plan, the same judge who sent the Alton
Box Board price-fixers to prison.
103 See the proposed Federal Chartering Act as
advanced by the Corporate Accountability Research
Group. TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION, supra note
3. The Group contends that state chartering has
become a "costly anachronism" that allows major
corporations to avoid accountability for their actions.
(e.g., the Delaware provision for indemnification
insurance.) A federal charter would "constitutionalize
the corporation" by, inter alia, providing for a new
array of criminal penalties. See generally TAMING THE
GIANT CORPORATION, supra note 3. See alo CONSTI-
TUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR
FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS
(1976); Symposium, Federal Chartering of Corporations,
61 GEO. L.J. 71-149 (1972).
be authorized to act against white collar crimi-
nals in both federal and state courts. 06
A second rehabilitative proposal is to facili-
tate employees' "blowing the whistle" on cor-
porate illegality. 07 Obviously a great deal of
corporate crime goes unreported because dis-
sent within the corporate hierarchy is not pos-
sible. Although this could be due to a sense of
loyalty to one's superiors and/or corporation, a
more likely explanation is that it stems from
the "love it or leave it" philosophy which per-
meates the law of private employment relation-
ships.0
There are two means by which whistle-blow-
ing could be encouraged. The first is to devise
a sanction which would require corporations
convicted of criminal violations to employ "su-
pervisors" for key tasks, who would be respon-
sible for compliance with the law." This ap-
proach would seem particularly effective for
public welfare offenses which are less easily
concealed, for example, than price-fixing con-
spiracies. The second approach to this problem
is to devise a new sanction or utilize existing
ones which would protect from enployer retal-
iation regular employees who decide to blow
the whistle. Model statutory provisions include
the "just cause" requirements of the National
Labor Relations Act"0 and the anti-employee
discrimination provisions in the Federal Water
106 ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMM. ON
ECONOMIC OFFENSES, RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (1977).
107 For a thorough analysis of this approach, see
R. NADER, P. PETKAs & K. BLACKWELL, WHISTLE
BLOWING (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHISTLE BLOW-
ING].
108 Because of his comparative mobility, the indi-
vidual worker has long been highly vulnerable to
private economic power. In fact, the traditional rule
is that all employers "may dismiss their employees at
will ... for good cause, for no cause, or even for
cause morally wrong, without thereby being guilty of
legal wrong." Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 COLUM. L. RE'., 1404, 1405 (1967) (quoting
Payne v. Western At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20
(1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters,
132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915)).
109 Christopher Stone suggests that such supervi-
sors could be at all levels of the corporation, from
"general public directors" to function in the public
interest at the board level, to quality control person-
nel responsible for potential safety, environmental
health problems. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS,
118-248 (1975).
"10 Section 8(a) (4) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970), makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to discharge or otherwise
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Pollution Control Act."1' A problem with this
latter proposal, however, is that there is no
guarantee that, even with the promise of job
protection, there are sufficient numbers of
employees who would be aware of corporate
illegality and, more importantly, would be will-
ing to "rock the boat" by reporting it." 2
Corporate Quarantine
First articulated in S. 1, this sanction would
suspend the right of the corporation to engage
in interstate or foreign commerce for a term to
which an individual would have been sentenced
to prison for the same offense. ' 13 Such a pro-
cedure is similar to the Securities Exchange
Commission's power to suspend operations or
revoke the registration of brokers and
dealers."14 The chief advantages of this form
of "corporate incapacitation" are that it would
overcome the bookkeeping problems of the
proposed corporate fine, and it would impress
upon shareholders, employees, customers and
other businesses the severity of the offense.
However, there are several problems with the
proposal which make its realization unlikely.
First, its deterrent, retributive and educational
value could probably be achieved by less dra-
conian measures, such as a fine or limited
publicity requirement. Second, employees and
the community surrounding a quarantined cor-
poration would suffer for the period of suspen-
sion. Third, the proposal fails to protect the
contractual and other obligations of the corpo-
ration to innocent lenders and customers. Fi-
nally, the enforcement problems would be
enormous, particularly for a large corporation
with dispersed operations.
discriminate against an employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this subchap-
ter."
"' Section 507 of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act protects employees from discharge or dis-
crimination resulting from their institution of or
participation in any proceedings under the Act. 33
U.S.C. § 1367 (1976).
12 For several case studies of persons from all
levels of the corporate and governmental hierarchies,
who were willing to blow the whistle for the sake of
the public interest, see WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note
107, at 35-179.
113S. 1, supra note 95, at § 1-441(c) (1).
"'See § 15(b)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §780(b)(4)(1970).
Forced Disolution
Section 6.04 of the Model Penal Code"' au-
thorizes a prosecuting attorney in a criminal
action to institute quo uarranto proceedings in a
state court of general jurisdiction to forfeit the
charter of a corporation organized under the
state's laws. The court may order the charter
forfeited upon finding that the corporation or
its agents have purposefully engaged in a
course of criminal conduct, and that the public
interest requires protection from further ille-
gality. For criminal violations of federal regu-
latory laws, some plan integrating state and
federal prosecutions would have to be
devised."'6 Moreover, because this sanction is
the equivalent of "corporate capital punish-
ment," it would have to be reserved for only
the most persistent and egregious instances of
corporate criminality. However, the relative
infrequency of the use of the sanction itself
would probably tend to render its general and
specific deterrent value negligible." ' Finally,
even if the corporation's charter is revoked,
there would be little to stop a corporation from
re-incorporating in another state. I"
Liberal Construction of Existing Statutes and
Regulations
There are at least three existing federal sanc-
tions which might be deployed against a corpo-
ration subsequent to a criminal conviction.
None has as yet been used to combat corporate
crime, but all could conceivably appear in a
government brief arguing in favor of stricter
criminal penalties for a corporate defendant.
1. Conspiracy Against the Rights of Citizen.%, 18
U.S.C. §241, provides that a S10,000 fine and
ten years imprigonment may be imposed "[i]f
two or more persons conspire to injure, op-
press, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the
free exercise or enjoyment of an)' right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution of
11, MODEL PENAL CODE, §6.04(2)(a), supra note
94.
16 See note 106 vupra and accompanying text.
If the probability of the sanctions being im-
posed is extremely'low, it is unlikely that a corpora-
tion will even consider the costs of dissolution when
weighing the benefits and costs of a course of illegal
conduct.
"s A federal charter for the corporations would,
of course, solve this particular problem. See note 105
supra.
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the United States."' 9 Theoretically, this statute
could protect a citizen's "right" to a clean envi-
ronment,'2 0 to a competitive market place,'
2
'
or to be safe from unadulterated food and
drugs, were such rights to be constitutionally
recognized. However, the uncertainty of such
recognition, as well as the courts' unwillingness
to extend this section beyond the civil rights
area into the commercial world, 12 2 greatly di-
minish the present effectiveness of this sanc-
tion.
2. Forfeiture of Property in Transit, 15 U.S.C.
§6, authorizes the United States to confiscate
all goods used in any federal conspiracy in
restraint of trade covered by the Sherman Act
and to sell them at auction. 2 3 Although there
is no evidence that this section has been used
in the past for such purposes, it has been
suggested that it be the basis for selling off
divisions of a corporation which has been con-
victed of repeated antitrust violations. 124 This
procedure would have the effect of a partial
dissolution, without the need to revoke the
state charter. A less drastic use of the statute
would be to confiscate only particular items of
inventory; the effect of which could be similar
to that of a direct monetary fine on the corpo-
ration.
3. Federal Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R.
§ 1-1.6, authorizes "suspension" or "debar-
ment" from government contracting for crimi-
nal offenses incidental to obtaining a public or
private contract, or for "other cause of such
serious and compelling nature, affecting re-
sponsibility as a Government contractor, as may
be determined by the agency to warrant sus-
"19 18 U.S.C. §241 (1970).
120 For a provocative argument that environmental
protection would be best achieved via amendment to
the federal and state constitutions, see Platt, Toward
Constitutional Recognition of the Environment, 56
A.B.AJ. 1061 (1970).
121 "The Sherman Antitrust Law ... represents a
settled tradition in favor of free competition and
free enterprise., i. A violation of the antitrust law
is a violation of strongly entrenched moral senti-
inents." SUTHERLAND, supra, note 19, at 45.
122 The section and its predecessors have not been
held to protect either contractual rights, e.g., Hay-
wood v. United States, 268 F. 795 (7th Cir. 1920),
cert. denied, 256 U.S. 689 (1921), or rights arising out
of labor relations. E.g., United States v. DeLaurentis,
491 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1974).
1- 15 U.S.C. §6 (1970).
124 CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at
333-34.
pension."125 This latter clause could conceivably
include causes such as poor quality control
procedures which resulted in a criminal viola-
tion of a federal public welfare law, or a price-
fixing conviction for conspiring to rig private
contract bidding. Considering the importance
of federal government contracts to many
American corporations, 12 1 particularly those in
the defense industry, invocation of this regula-
tion could produce some remarkable conscious-
ness-raising. There are, however, drawbacks
to the use of this regulation as a supplement to
criminal sanctions. First, it might be unduly
harsh to so penalize a corporation for wrong-
doing in the private sphere, particularly when
it is heavily dependent on government work.
Second, strict application of the statute could
well result in higher costs to the government if
the lowest bidders happen to be suspended or
disbarred.
Sanctions Aimed at the idividual
Individual Fines
Modification of overbroad indemnification
statutes is the primary remedy for the present
ineffectiveness of individual fines. Although
there have been proposals that would prohibit
indemnification against the penalty and ex-
penses of any criminal action, 2 a more realistic
reform would be to bar indemnification and
indemnificaion insurance for criminal viola-
tions which require either a showing of willfull-
ness or gross negligence for conviction. This
would ensure that a corporate executive could
not be indemnified for his intentional miscon-
duct.'28 Two additional remedies for indemni-
12541 C.F.R. § 1-1.605-1 (2) (1976). Suspensions
may be imposed for up to a maximum of 18 months,
debarment for up to three years. 41 C.F.R. § 1-
1.605-1(a), I-1.604(5)(c) (1976).
16 For example, sonic 39% of Rockwell Interna-
tional's 1976 sales were under government contracts.
Rockwell International 1976 Annual Report, at 48.
For Litton Industries, this figure was 3417. Litton
Industries, Inc., Annual Report for the Fiscal Year
1976.
127 See note 105 .upra (Proposed Federal Charter-
ing Act).
129 Under current law indemnification would be
permissible for criminal violations of the Food and
Drug Act, where there is no intent requirement and
only a minimal participation requirement after
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). Indemni-
fication would not be permissible, however, for crim-
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fication statutes which seem warranted are
greater judicial control of settled and compro-
mised actions and mandatory disclosure of all
indemnity payments. The disclosure require-
ment could serve by itself as an effective deter-
rent since most executives are probably loathe
to having their misdeeds made known. In ad-
dition, it could serve educational and retribu-
tive goals by indicating to shareholders and
creditors the seriousness of the executive's of-
fense.
Once the factor of indemnification is elimi-
nated from criminal fines, the certainty of the
fine as well as the appropriateness of the
amount must be ensured such that the sanction
has credibility and does indeed function as a
deterrent. A mandatory minimum amount
would accomplish the objective of certainty, as
would judicial acceptance of the principle that
the nolo contendere plea is truly equivalent to a
guilty plea or guilty conviction, and that it
should not mean greater leniency. As for the
appropriateness of the amount of the fine
itself, this is an area where very little is known
in terms of deterrence of individuals.35 Thus,
apart from a minimum amount required by
law, the actual amount should be left to the
discretion of the sentencing judge to decide in
the circumstances of each case. One very im-
portant circumstance is whether the individual
is receiving compensation from his corporation
for the fine, even if not in the form of direct
indemnification for expenses or indemnifica-
tion insurance. For example, if it appears that
the executive is being given greater compensa-
tion in order to pay his own indemnification
premiums. either a higher fine or alternative
sanction ought to be employed.
Imprisonment
Greater certainty of a sentence of imprison-
ment following a criminal violation is likely to
be the best means of bridging the gap which
exists between the deterrent effects of a prison
stay (or threat of one) and the infrequency of
its use for corporate criminals. Thus, a manda-
tory sentence of some minimum length could
inal ,iolations of the Sherman Act, or recent public
welfare laws such as the Consumer Product Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2070 (Supp. 1975), where intent
must be shown.
129 ZIMRING, .upra note 37, at 194-95.
be established in the statute,3 0 with various
mitigating factors which the sentencing judge
could rely upon to vary the length of the sen-
tence. For example, the Justice Department
suggests four mitigating factors be taken into
account in reducing its recommended eighteen
month sentence for antitrust violators: cooper-
ation with the government, health, special fam-
ily circumstances and factors mitigating the de-
fendant's role in the offense.' 3 ' From a purely
economic standpoint, however, it can be ar-
gued that imprisonment is not an appropriate
remedy, at least for corporate executives who
have sufficient current assets to cover the
amount of the penalty. Under this argument,
fines and imprisonment are simply different
ways of imposing economic costs on violators.'32
Considering the high costs to society of im-
prisonment,' 33 a fine exacted from a finan-
cially-capable defendant is a much better allo-
cation of resources than imprisonment. In ad-
dition, Posner argues that any attempt to trans-
late the costs to society of corporate crime into
a non-monetary term of imprisonment, will
only result in leniencyY.
1 14
Disqualification
As suggested in both the proposed Federal
Charte.ing Act'35 and in S. 1'36 this sanction
would disqualify a corporate executive from
serving as an officer or director of any Ameri-
"' In January, 1977, Sen. Kennedy and the late
Sen. McClellan introduced S. 260 which would estab-
lish minimum sentences for certain federal offenses.
13' Government Sentencing Memorandum, United
States v. Alton Box Board, 784 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. D-3 (BNA 1976). The Government did
not believe that there was any basis for differentiating
among defendants with respect to involvement in
church or community affairs or lack of a prior
criminal record.
132 POSNER, supra note 47, at 364. Thus for the
judgment proof defendant, a term of imprisonment
is a means of imposing an economic cost in terms of
work opportunities lost.
" The costs include: (1) the expense of construct-
ing, maintaining and operating the prison; (2) the
loss of the incarcerated individual's legitimate pro-
duction, and (3) the probable impairment of any
legitimate productivity after release from prison.
POSNER, supra note 47, at 365.
134 R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 225 (1976).
135 TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION, supra note
3, at 249-51.
' S. I.supra note 95, §§1-4A1(c)(8), 1-4A3(b).
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can corporation or partnership for five years
following a conviction or nolo contendere plea.
The harshness of the sanction is lessened if the
individual is not actually fired, but merely
barred from holding a position of trust. Argu-
ably, however, the deterrent and retributive
value of the sanction is reduced concomitantly.
An analogous precedent in the civil area exists
under the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Procedure. "'- Section 504 of that Act
provides that conviction of a felony, or of the
reporting and trusteeship provisions of the Act,
prohibits a person from employment in a labor
organization.' '3
Behavioral Sanctions
Recently, several federal district court judges
have exercised their sentencing discretion by
imposing so-called "alternative sancions" on
white collar criminals. Examples include re-
quiring the defendant to make charitable do-
nations in lieu of a fine and ordering a group"
of convicted price-fixers to make speeches
13729 U.S.C. §§401-531 (1970).
'38 Section 504 provides in pertinent part:
Prohibition against certain persons holding of-
fice; violations and penalties
(a) No person who is or has been a member
of the Communist Party or who has been con-
victed of, or served any part of a prison term
resulting from his conviction of, robbery, brib-
ery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny,
burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, mur-
der, rape, assault with intent to kill, assault
which inflicts grievous bodily injury, or a viola-
tion of subchapter III or IV of this chapter, or
conspiracy to commit any such crimes, shall
serve-
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member
of any executive board or similar governing
body, business agent, manager, organizer, or
other employee (other than as an employee
performing exclusively clerical or custodial
duties) of any labor organization, or
(2) as a labor relations consultant to a per-
son engaged in an industry or activity affect-
ing commerce, or as an officer, director,
agent, or employee (other than as an em-
ployee performing exclusively clerical or cus-
todial duties) of any group or association of
employers dealing with any labor organiza-
tion,
during or for five years after the termination of
his membership in the Communist Party, or for
five years after such conviction or after the end
of such imprisonment ....
29 U.S.C. §504 (1975).
about the evils of price-fixing.3 9 There is con-
siderable disagreement over whether such sen-
tences actually promote any of the purposes of
the criminal law. Some argue that the publicity
which often surrounds such sanctions carries a
greater deterrent effect than the often less
publicized jail term. 40 On the other hand,
while such sanctions may serve as adequate
deterrents the first time they are imposed,
when repeated they could actually become
counterproductive if people begin to view the
offenses as mere technical violations and not
crimes. 4 ' Another general problem associated
with the use of behavioral sanctions today is
that they simply are not contemplated by cur-
rent statutes. Moreover, appeal of such sen-
tences is often frustrated by ajudge who simply
defers sentencing for several months while ad-
vising the defendants that charity work done
in the interim, for example, would be consid-
ered a mitigating factor.'4 2 A possible solution
is to include behavioral sanctions within the
statute for first offenses only, with the exact
nature of the sanction left to the discretion of
the sentencing judge. In this way, the sentence
could be appealed by the Government if neces-
sary, and at the same time the judge would not
need to resort to the ruse of sentencing defer-
ral.
CONCLUSION
The federal government is confronted today
with a major dilemma in its regulation of Amer-
ican business. On the one hand, the rate of
corporate crime is increasing and public aware-
ness of such criminality appears to be building.
On the other hand, the available network of
criminal sanctions applicable to corporate crime
has proven ineffective. Despite its failure up to
this point, however, the criminal law is a viable
weapon for reconciling these two phenomena
and reducing the incidence of corporate illegal-
ity. Granted, there is no clear consensus re-
139 See White CollarJuvtice, supra note 2, at 5-12.
'
40 Id. at 10.
T4, "lhe Antitrust Division has opposed such alter-
native sentences not only because they are not con-
templated by the statutes, but because the -Division
believes they are of little deterrent value. Former
head of the Division, Donald I. Baker, derided such
sanctions as transforming "a criminal into a luncheon
circuit speaker." 790 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REc.. REP.
AA-I (BNA).
'4 White CollarJustice, supra note 2, at 10.
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garding the morality of corporate crime, but
realistically none is needed. As long as there is
,some sense of moral opprobrium attached to
such crime in our society, Congress should
continue to employ criminal sanctions to com-
bat it.
The primary purpose to which new criminal
sanctions should be directed is general deter-
rence. Although our knowledge of the actual
effects of criminal punishment in general is
limited, deterrence seems to be the'theory most
easil) quantified in terms of fixing a type of
punishment for corporate crime which will
produce the desired effect. This is particularly
true when the motives and effects of the cor-
porate illegality can be translated into economic
terms. Retribution and education are legitimate
goals as well, but their very nature dictates that
thev can he treated as beneficial by-products of
criminal sanctions designed chiefly as deter-
rents. In addition, rehabilitation and incapaci-
tation ought to be recognized as goals for
criminal sanctions directed against the corpo-
rate entity.
As for the specific proposals for new criminal
sanctions, there are in most cases persuasive
arguments on both sides regarding their feasi-
bilitv and effectiveness. For example, the fine
which takes into account the size of the corpo-
rate offender, as well as the gradient of the
harm caused by the violation, would seem to
be a good general and specific deterrent. How-
ever, the possibility might exist that the modern
corporation is able to absorb punishment such
that the real burden falls upon shareholders,
creditors, consumers and the community. Sim-
ilarly, no amount of reform of indemnification
statutes will achieve greater deterrent effect
for individual criminal fines if corporations
simply increase an executive's salary such that
the individual is able to pay his or her own
insurance premiums. In short, our knowledge
of the relationship between the theories of
criminal punishment and the nature of the
modern corporation is not sufficiently devel-
oped to permit a committment to a particular
sanction for a particular class of crimes. In-
stead, an effort should be made to authorize as
wide a range of credible penalties as possible
and to then examine their effectiveness. In this
manner the sentencing judge will be able to
adjust sentences for corporate crime both for
the circumstances of each case, as well as for
the observed effectiveness of the available sanc-
tions.
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